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When we discuss the state of exception in this pandemic, we need to approach
it holistically. Given the systemic nature of this crisis, the distinction between
normality and exception is not an exclusive issue in the political system. In particular,
global markets do not merely react passively to whatever virus is pandemically
spreading and whatever emergency measure is taken by states on the basis of a
state of exception; instead, these shocks trigger a self-standing decision within the
sphere of the market between the normal “business as usual” and the exceptional
deviation from fundamental principles of market exchange. In other words, there
exists a private state of exception that is shaping this crisis. This private state of
exception is negotiated within the doctrines of private law, but this pandemic also
reveals how global private orders consisting of contracts allow lead firms in global
commodity production to act as private sovereigns that can declare independently
the presence of an exceptional situation. This contribution focuses on these private
sovereigns, the legal bases on which they act and on the dire need for them to be
constitutionalized.
The consequences of the pandemic for global value
chains
To make the analysis tangible, I focus on global value chains. Global value chains
linked to transnational corporations account for 70% – 80% of global trade and
thus are a constituting feature of the global economy. Global value chains are
the organizational structures that undergird the production and distribution of
commodities. During this pandemic, global value chains are under much pressure:
lockdown measures in several countries lead to a significant decrease in consumer
demand on the distribution end of the value chain. The halt in production in various
other countries under lockdown conditions (China as the ‘Factory of the World’ in
particular) result in decreasing supply. Moreover, export bans and price regulations
by countries with high-demand medical products, such as face masks or sanitizers,
cause re-adaption of certain industries and a re-structuring of supply-chains, often
at the expense of precarious workforce further downstream the chain. Global value
chains are particularly vulnerable to such exogenous shocks due to their fragile
and volatile character that relies on just-in-time production without stocking and
warehousing of goods and the dynamic pricing that is often linked to highly volatile
derivative markets. Yet, this external shock becomes internally decisive only when
it is translated into internal measures taken by actors that affect the organization of
the value chain as a whole. In other words, external crises provide a basis for an
autonomous decision within the chain on whether to continue “business as usual” or
deviate from this normal state because of an exceptional (!) situation.
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The core legal category underlying global value chains is the contract. Related to
this is contract law. How, then, is the state of normality and the state of exception
determined in contracts and contract law? In particular, who decides when there is a
state of exception under which the institutionalised rules on contracting (pacta sunt
servanda and, specifically, pay for delivery) are lifted? There are two answers to this
question.
First answer: Contract law doctrine and exceptional
situations
In classical contract law doctrine, the main entry points for exceptional
circumstances are the doctrines of frustration, hardship and force majeure.
Pursuant to these categories, parties can terminate contracts, are released from
performance of contractual obligations or may adapt their contracts when unforeseen
circumstances arise. It comes as no surprise that these doctrines – so far taught
in contract law classes only as an ancillary peculiar feature of contract law – have
now become a hot topic among contract law scholars and practitioners. When
conflicts between contracting parties arise on whether such special circumstances
release parties from performing contracts as planned, it is traditionally courts that
decide whether these doctrines have been validly relied upon by one party in the
contract and also what contractual consequences follow (for instance whether a non-
performing party has to still pay damages or not). Hence, courts have historically
been the dominant sites in which the consequences of crises for contracts were
decided upon. From this perspective, the doctrines on frustration, hardship and force
majeure would, similarly to other general clauses such as good faith, become entry
points for a constitutionalisation of private law. In this pandemic, courts would further
finetune the distinction between normality and exception through these doctrines and
develop related categories on what consequences should be attached to it regarding
contract performance and damages.
Second answer: Contractual arrangements of global
value chains and exceptional situations
The much more likely scenario of deciding on the presence of an exceptional
situation is, however, that the contractual arrangements equip certain actors in the
chain with the unilateral power to decide whether or not to perform in exceptional
circumstances. The core feature of global value chains, just-in-time production,
highly volatile production and pricing mechanisms, are enshrined in their contractual
arrangements: Regularly, there is a general framework agreement between the
parties that specifies the basis for the contractual relation (and which is normally full
of standard contract terms including contract terms on hardship and force majeure).
On this basis, specific short-term orders are placed with related volatile mechanisms
that determine the price. It is only this specific order that forms the actual contract
on the sale of goods. However, with this type of arrangement, an asymmetrical
relation between the parties is in place. It allows one party to decide when to place
orders, which is often combined with beneficial standard agreements concerning the
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payment mechanism for the ordering party. With this legal mechanism in place, the
decision not to perform a contract due to an exceptional situation can be declared
simply by not placing an order. This is legally valid, although it happens at the
expense of the supply parties further down the chain that have already incurred
costs in anticipation of production.
This is exactly the tactic in place in consumer-sensitive sectors facing a decrease in
demand due to lock-downs and less demand from consumers. A good example is
what is currently happening in the textile industry: Suppliers are already left without
or with significantly reduced orders by large apparel brands for the coming months.
Large retailers claim that they are not able to take delivery of already produced
goods with reference to contractually agreed hardship clauses in the framework
agreements and they simply decline to place new orders in anticipation that they
will not be able to sell them to consumers. The costs of the lockdowns are thus
not equally distributed over the actors in the chain; instead, they privilege the lead
firms that can unilaterally deviate from existing production processes due to their
own interpretation of exceptional circumstances. Eventually, it is thus the leading
firms in a value chains that can factually and are legally allowed to declare the state
of exception. And even where such measures may be subject to legal uncertainty
(because the application of the contractual hardship clause is unclear or there is
a possibility to read into the framework agreements good faith obligations to place
anticipated orders and not disappoint reasonable expectations), it is difficult for those
negatively affected to have the decision controlled by courts. Court proceedings
(provided they are available at all due to the dominance of arbitration in global
commerce) are slow, much too slow if the decision of not placing an order can
result in immediate insolvency of the suppliers due to the size of the stopped order
and the dependency of the supplier on a few large-scale orders from a certain
buyer. Instead, the lead firm’s decision to interrupt or reorder their sourcing streams
with a view to being less affected by the crisis have sparked different reactions by
suppliers. Suppliers seeking to mitigate the damage themselves and advancing their
position in the value chain appear to redirect their capacities to other commodities
that promise high-demand supply. But they do so at their own costs with increasing
uncertainty on whether this will pay off and at the expenses of weaker parties, such
as precariously employed factory workers.
The conclusion is then that the private arrangements in global markets, global
value chains, are legally constructed in a manner so as to allow specific dominant
parties (the lead firms) to unilaterally deviate from the ordinary rules on contract
performance when they find themselves in exceptional circumstances. Such lead
firms are the private sovereigns that are able to unilaterally declare the state
of exception in global markets and have its fundamental principle of pacta sunt
servanda disregarded.
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Constitutionalizing corporations and global value
chains
This leads us to the final, essentially constitutional, question: What are the
constitutional limitations for these private sovereigns when declaring and handling
the state of exception? The power of states to take back control by imposing such
limitations from the outside is limited. In fact, it can be dangerous, as it may not
reflect sufficiently the Eigen-structure of market relations and their power structure. A
good example for the problem is the legal interventions by the German government
into the system of (rental) contracts with its Janus-headed consequences in terms of
what actors claim to rely on it.
Therefore, Eigen-constitutionalization of global value chains and corporations is the
answer! The limitations themselves have to derive from within the private structure
itself, from the terms, standards and commitments that govern corporations and
global value chains, but, importantly, these need to be externally enforced and
regulated. One option is social enforcement. It has recently been quite effective
in the case of textile brands where public outcry that has made some large firms
revoke their declaration of the state of exception (Adidas most prominently by
eventually deciding not to rely on the above-mentioned law on non-performance
of rental obligations and publicly declaring to perform their contracts) or at least
mitigate its effects (several textile brands responded to criticism by human rights
advocates about not bailing out their suppliers by taking delivery of produced orders
and not re-negotiating prices despite market price drop). And there needs to be legal
enforcement through private law. Private law has the tools to legally enforce and
regulate the inner-constitution of corporations, their commitments to treat suppliers
fairly and work together with solving problems. And for the global value chains, there
is the powerful tool of reviewing the standard contract terms (including hardship
clauses) that govern the value chain as a whole through the framework agreements.
Despite their ambiguous character between a contract and a pre-contractual relation,
these framework agreements (with recent legal support of new types of laws on
fair trading behaviour) can provide a basis for requiring fair and responsible trading
practices of lead firms even under exceptional circumstances.
All of these will be the private principles that also and in particular apply when firms
declare the presence of a state of exception by deciding to not meet their obligation
to perform. Against this background, I urge private lawyers to enter into a similarly
dense discussion on the state of exception and its constitutional framework as
constitutional lawyers already have in the past weeks. In particular, we need to focus
on the principles and limitations in private law and private ordering that are and
should be governing the private sovereigns in this state of exception.
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